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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNJ1~Y M. HORMAN and 
'l1HEODORE HORMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LIQ LH)R CONTROL COMMISSION 
OF lrrAH and GALAXY OUTDOOR 
ADVERTISING, INC., 
Defenda.nts and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10933 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for an extraordinary writ directing 
defendant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, to re-
peal or revoke its Regulation No. 4 authorizing the ad-
vertising of light beer on billboards within the State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied defendant, Liquor ·Control 
Commission's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
wherein it was alleged that plaintiffs had failed to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted, whereupon, 
the defendants answered. 
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a Motion for Summary 
.Judgment which the lower court denied, at the same 
tune oTantin()' defendants' oral Motion for Summary 
b b 
Judgment made concurrently therewith. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Judgment of the lower 
court with instructions to enter a writ requiring defend-
ant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, to rescind its 
Regulation No. 4 as not authorized by statute. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of Salt Lake 
County and the plaintiff, Theodore Horman, is the father 
of minor children who are also citizens and residents of 
Salt Lake County. 
Defendant, Liquor Control Commission of Utah, is 
a governmental agency of the State of Utah, with author-
ity to sue and be sued, with the written consent of the 
Governor. The Governor of Utah has consented to the 
bringing of this action. 
The defendant Commission is authorized, pursuant 
to Section 32-1-7 UCA 1953, to make Resolutions, Orders 
and Regulations not inconsistent with the Utah Liquor 
Control Act, which Act is an exercise of the police pow-
ers of the State of Utah, adopted in part for the protec-
tion of the public health, peace and morals of the citizens 
of the State. 
For many years prior to March 22, 1966 the Com-
mission promulgated the following Regulation: 
"All advertising of alcoholic beverages, inclu.ding 
light beer on billboards, sign boards, road signs, 
Painted b~lletins electric or illuminated signs, ~r ' · . f . er lS on or in anv other form of exterior adver 1smi-i ?"' 
hereby prohibited except as provided in 32-7-~ 1 
3 
1!tah Code Annotated 1953, and in these regula-
tions. Th~ term 'exterior advertising, is con-
strued ~o mclude any advertising, displayed or 
set outside the premises or at any place within, 
upon or attached to the premises if the same is 
visible from the outside, and the regulations here-
in promulgated are intended to cover all such 
advertising." 
On or about March 22, 1966 defendant Commission 
re11ealed this Regulation, and in lieu thereof passed and 
promulgated the following Regulation: 
"REGULATION NO. 4. 
"A. Alcoholic beverages, excluding light beer, 
shall not be advertised in any manner which is 
contrary to Section 32-7-27, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
"B. Light beer may be advertised in any reason-
able manner consistent with the public interest, 
subject to the following conditions: 
" ( 1) The approval of the commission must first 
be obtained for every form of advertising display 
or method which utilizes family pets, family 
scenes, drinking scenes or which the advertiser 
has reason to believe would be deemed contrary 
to the public interest by the commission. In such 
an event, the advertiser shall submit to the com-
mission a specimen of the proposed advertise-
ment, and the commission will approve or dis-
approve the same. If approved, no published 
advertisement shall contain any statement of ap-
proval by the commission. 
" ( 2) The commission will not approve any 
advertising proposal, sign, display, s~ste~ .or 
method which alludes to minors, or which is m-
consistent with good taste or public morals. 
4 
" ( 3) On orde: of the commission any sign, di~­
play or advertisement which the commission shall 
?onsider objectionable or contrary to the publil' 
mterest, shall be removed." 
In the case of Bird & Jex Co. vs. Funk, 96 Utah-±50 
I 
85 P.2d 831, the Utah Supreme Court construed the pow-
ers of the Utah Liquor Control Commission. Under an 
identical statute the Court ruled that the Commission 
did not have the power to allow outdoor advertising of 
beer on billboards and concluded in its opinion therein: 
"Holding as we do, tha,t billboard and other out-
door display advertising is prohibited by the Act, 
the Appellants are in no position to question the 
validity of the other Regulations adopted by the 
Commission, and for that reason we refrain from 
passing on them." 85 P.2d 837 (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
Plainbffs allege that the advertising of light beer 
in violation of the statutes of the State of Utah as inter-
preted by the Utah Supreme Court is damaging to the 
health, peace and morals of the plaintiffs and of the said 
minor children and other citizens of this State and that 
plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy or adequate rem-
edy at law to protect themselves and the minor children 
aforesaid against the actions of defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE OF UTAH IS 
SUFFICIENT TO REGULATE OR PROHIBIT ADVERTIS-
ING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. 
The Utah Liquor Control ,Commission was estab-
lished by the Legislature in 1935 and was given power to 
5 
manage and control the liquor monopoly on behalf of 
the State of Utah. 'There has been considerable litiga-
tion over the constitutionality of Utah liquor control 
acts. However, it seems clear that the police power of 
tl1e state is sufficient to regulate and prohibit traffic in 
alcoholic beverages and to regulate or prohibit advertis-
ing in connection therewith. See Riggins vs. District 
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645; 
Annotation 19 A.L.R. 2d 1114. In this regard Section 
32-1-2 UCA 1953, provides: 
"This Act shall be deemed an exercise of the 
police powers of the state for the protection of 
the public health, peace and morals; to prevent 
the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; 
to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful 
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic 
beverages ; and all provisions of this Act shall be 
liberally construed for the attainment of these 
purposes." 
In order to further the avowed purpose of the Liquor 
Control Act, the Commission, among other things, is 
granted regulatory powers. Section 32-1-7 provides: 
''The Commission may, from time to time, make 
such resolutions, orders and regulations not in-
consistent with this Act, as it may deem necessary 
for carrying out the provisions thereof and for 
its efficient administration .... " 
As a further indication of legislative intention, Sec-
tion 32-7-2fi UCA 1953, provides: 
''The advertising of alcoholic beverages by t~e 
Cnrrnnission and any window display thereof m 
its store are hereby especially prohibited, ex~ept 
that the Commission may provide for appropnate 
6 
signs on win~o~ or front. of building, denoting 
the fact that it is a s~ate liquor. store or package 
agency and may provide for prmted price lists." 
Section 32-7-27 continues: 
"The prohibition against advertising alcoholic 
beverages and
1 
agai~st. window displays in liquor 
stores of the Comm1ss1on shall apply in like man-
ner to all manufacturers and licensees of alcoholic 
b~verages and to package ·agencies. This prrni-
swn shall be construed to prohibit the 'Use of an11 
electric or illuminated signs, contrivance or de-
vice, signboard, billboard, or other display signs, 
and to prohibit the display of alcoholic beverages 
or price lists in windows or show cases visible to 
passersby, and to prohibit the use of any other 
means of inducing persons to buy alcoholic bev-
erages or to enter places where alcoholic bever-
ages are sold, provided, that a simple designation 
of the fact that beer, wine or other liquors are 
manufactured or sold under authority derived 
from the Commission may be placed in or upon 
the window or front of the place of business hav-
ing such authority; and provided, further, that 
advertising of light beer shall be permitted under 
such regitlation as the Commission may make." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under this authorization, the Commission has adopt-
ed the regulation which is the subject of dispute herein. 
POINT II. 
THE UT AH SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY RULED 
THAT UT AH STATUTES PROHIBIT OUTDOOR ADVERTIS-
ING OF LIGHT BEER ON BILLBOARDS. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Bird & Je:r 
·d d an Co. vs. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831, eons1 ere · 
· c · · from action to restrain the Llquor Control omnnssrnn 
7 
enforcement of the regulation in question. It was alleged 
therein that this regulation discriminated against ad-
verfo;ers of beer and that it arrogated to the Commis-
sion the right to dictate the kind and type of copy that 
should be used in beer advertisements. It was contended 
that the phrase, "advertising of light beer shall be per-
mitted'' should bind the Commission to allow and not to 
prohibit the advertising then in use, including billboards. 
It was further argued that the Commission could only 
make and enforce reasonable regulations addressed to 
the content of such advertising matter and could not 
prohibit billboard advertising of beer. 
The Utah Supreme Court said: 
"The question whether or not the powers granted 
to tbe Liquor Commission are constitutional is 
not in dispute here, although appellants intimate 
that if the rules and regulation promulgated by 
the Liquor Commission are determined by this 
Court to be within the powers granted by the 
legislature to the Commission, then such delega-
tion of powers must of necessity be unconstitu-
tional. The only question to he determined at the 
moment is ... does the Liquor Control Commis-
sion have the power to prohibit the billboard 
adwrtising in the face of the last provision in 
( 32-7-27 UCA 1953) ." 
The Court continued: 
"Where the legislature delegates to an admini-
strative agency power to make rules an~ regula-
tions, such delegation must be ~ccomi:i~ied b~ a 
dPelared policy outlining the field WJthm which 
~mch rules and regulations may be adopted .... 
F'rom this it must necessarily follow that all rules 
8 
and regulations adopted by an administrative 
~oard or agency must be in furtherance of and 
tollow out the declared policies of the legislative 
enactment. If the regulations or rules are in 
excess of the declared purposes of the statute 
they are invalid.'' ' 
* * * 
''\Vhat are the declared policies of the le(J'islature 
. b 
with respect to the rules and regulations of the 
Liquor Commission here in dispute"! rrhe de-
clared general purposes of the Liquor Control 
Act, under which the Liquor C01m11ission derives 
its authority, are 'for the protection of the public 
health, peace and morals; to prevent the re-
currence of abuses associated with saloons; to 
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unla\\'ful 
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic 
beverages .... ' The declared policy with respect 
to advertisement of alcoholic beverages is stated 
in, (32-7-27, UCA 1953) as prohibiting the use of 
any means of inducing persons to buy any of such 
beverages or entering places idiere they arc 
sold." (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
"In determining the meaning of the provision, ''.'e 
must take particular note of the section wherem 
it stands as well as the general tenor of the act. 
The Liquor Act defines 'alcoholic beverage' ~o 
include light beer so that when that phrase is 
used, light beer is inrluded. Therefore, when See-
tion (32-7-27 l1CA 1953), refers to alcoholie bev-
erages and prohibits advertising of them, ad''.c1: 
tising of light beer is included in that prohibi-
tion." 
" (Section 32-7-27) may b0 divi.ded in four pa.rt8• 
two prohibitions and two provisos as follows· 
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" ( 1) A specific prohibition against billboard 
signs and other displays; 
" ( 2) A general prohibition of all other advertis-
ing an~ all "means of inducing persons to buy 
alcoholic beverages or to ent~r places where alco-
holic beverages are sold'; 
" ( 3) A proviso permitting a sign on the window 
or ~ront of 3:utho:ized premises and limiting it to 
a snnple designation of the fact that beer or other 
beverage is sold or manufactured· and 
' " ( 4) rrhe proviso 'that advertising of light beer 
shall be permitted under such regulation as the 
Commission may make.' 
''The first proviso effects the specific prohibition 
against billboard and display advertising while 
the second proviso is carved out of the general 
prohibition against all other advertising. 
''It seems obvious that the legislature intention 
~was clearly to limit to a narrow field the adver-
tising of alcoholic beverages, including light beer, 
and the whole purpose of the act is to reduce 
solicitation of such beverages to an actual mini-
mum whether by advertisements or otherwise. 
Surely the office of the proviso is not to set aside 
and declare for naught the specific prohibition 
against billboard and other sign au.vertising. The 
prohibition is definite, specific and all compre-
hensive. There can be no doubt but that the legis-
lature, at least in the first part of the section, 
intended to prohibit all billboard advertising of 
light beer and other alcoholic beverages. If the 
second proviso be construed to mean what appel-
lant contends for, it would make for naught that 
part of the section. The prohibition would .no 
longer stand as to light beer. Such construct~on 
would give to the proviso the effect of settmg 
aside the specific prohibition against billboard 
10 
advertising of light_ beer. . . . No such intent can 
be found elsewhere m the statute .... " 85 P.2d 835 
. The 
1
Court stated that the previously cited regu. 
lat10n of the Commission was in effect a prohibition of 
billboard and sign advertising of alcoholic beverages and 
constituted "but a re-assertion of the specific provision 
of (32-7-27) which effectively prohibits such advertising. 
The judgment of the District Court holding that bill. 
board and other outdoor display advertising of beer was 
prohibited by the act 'vas affirmed when the Court 
concluded: 
"Holding as we do, that billboard amd other oitf-
door display advertising is prohibited by the Act, 
the Appellants are in no position to question the 
validity of the other Regulations adopted by the 
Commission, and for that reason we refrain from 
passing of them." 85 P.2d 837 (Emphasis added) 
Accordingly, plaintiffs submit that light beer may 
not be advertised on billboards in the State of Utah by 
virtue of the Utah statutes themselves, and that, there-
fore, the Utah Liquor Control Commission may not 
promulgate regulations allowing such advertising. 
POINT III. 
THERE IS NO DISCRIMINATION IN A PROHIBITION 
OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING WHILE AT THE SAME TIME 
ALLOWING RADIO AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING. 
It has been suggested, however, that to allow radio 
or television advertising of light beer and at the same 
time to prohibit billboard advertising thereof is to dis-
criminate against advertising media. It has also be~n 
suggested that the regulation of liquor advertising 18 
11 
violative of the interstate commerce clause of the United 
States Constitution. It seems appropriate to deal briefly 
with both of these objections. 
11lrn question of discrimination against advertising 
uwdia was raised in the Bird & Jex case previously 
reft>rred to. The Utah Supreme Court assumed therein 
that the act was constitutional and did not specifically 
sveak to the question of discrimination. However, regu-. 
lations controlling the advertising of various types of 
alcoholic beverages or various kinds of advertising 
thereof have generally been upheld. 
The Connecticut court has upheld a regulation pro-
hibiting any reitailer from having any exterior sign or 
other advertising matter bearing the name or trademark 
of a manufacturer of alcoholic beverages. See Amarone 
r. Brc11nan, 126 Connecticut 451, 11 A.2d 850. A Vir-
ginia regulation prohibiting unlicensed dealers from 
advertising intoxicating liquors but not prohibiting li-
censed dealers from so advertising was upheld as con-
stitutional in Commonwealth v. Anheuser Bush, Inc.; 
181 Va. 678, 26 SE2d 94. A Montana regulation pro-
hibiting the advertisement of liquors on sign boards or 
billboards, but allowing signs advertising beer or malt 
liquor to be placed on a brewery or premises where beer 
1rns lawfnlly stored was upheld in Fletcher v. Paige, 
220 P. 484, 19 A.L.R.2d 1108. 
It seems generally accepted that the manufacture 
and sale of intoxicating liquors, where permitted, is a 
lawful business which is fully entitled to protection but 
that nevertheless it can be regarded as dangerous to 
12 
public health, safety and morals and is, therefore, sub-
ject to strict regulation by the states under their police 
power. This regulation has been held generally to include 
the prohibition or regulation of advertising. See 30 Am 
J ur. Intoxicating Liquors, Sec. 69; Annotation, 19 ALR2<l 
1114. 
It is also clear that by virtue of the Wilson Act, 27 
USC, Sec. 121, no serious claim of interference with 
interstate commerce can be raised. This act provides 
that all intoxicating liquors transported into any state 
shall, upon arrival, be subject to the operation of the 
police power of that state and shall not be exempted by 
reason of the interstate commerce clause. Several courts 
construing this act have reasoned that the state's power 
to prevent the sales of intoxicating liquor carries with it 
the power to prevent the solicitation of sales, which is 
the same as advertising. See Advertiser Co. v. State, 
193 Ala. 418, 69 Southern 501; State ex. rel. West v. 
State Capital Co., 24 Okl. 252, 103 Pac. 1021; Cf. State 
v. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013. 
The United States Supreme Court has spoken rela-
. tive to alleged discrimination against outdoor advertising 
as compared to other advertising media. In the case of 
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 US. 105, 52 C. Ct. 273, 67 
L.Ed. 643, that Court had before it the validity of a Utah 
Statute prohibiting billboard advertising of cigarettes. 
It was contended bv the appellant that the Utah law was 
discriminatory, im~osed an unreasonable classificatio~ 
and violated the commerce clause as well as the 14t 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 
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l\fr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous 
l·ourt, upheld the Utah legislation. He stated: "'There is 
a difference which justifies the classifieation between 
display advertising and that in periodicals or news-
papers .... " 
In quoting from the lower court's decision he con-
tinued: 
" 'Billboards, street car signs, and placards and 
such a re in a class by themselves. They are wholly 
intrastate. . . . Advertisements of this sort are 
constantly before the eyes of observers on the 
streets. . . . Other forms of advertising are ordi-
narily seen as a matter of choice on the part of 
the observer .... These distinctions clearly place 
this kind of advertising in a position to be classi-
fied so that regulations or prohibitions may be 
imposed upon all within the class.' " 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also 
included liquor among the special category of articles 
which are subject to exceptional control by the legisla-
hues of the various states and has sustained controls 
and regulations "which would have been repugnant to 
the great guarantees of the constitution but for the en-
larged right possessed by the government to regulate 
liquor." Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 
U.S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the pro-
hibition of billboard advertising should be upheld by the 
eourts as constitutional. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFFS HA VE ST ANDING TO CHALLENGE AC-
TIONS OF THE UT AH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
14 
Plaintiffs filed below their Petition seeking an extra. 
ordinary writ under Rule 65B, DROP, to prevent the 
Liquor Control Commission of Utah from acting in direct 
contravention of what Plaintiffs believe to be the hold-
ing of the Utah Supreme Court in Bird & Jex Co. v. F1knk, 
96 Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831. \Vith respect to the right to 
seek such an extraordinary writ it must be noted that 
there is a difference between proceedings to enforce a 
purely private right and proceedings wherein it is sought 
to compel performance of a public duty. 
The defendant commission claims that Plaintiffs 
may have insufficient interest in the actions of the Liquor 
Control Commission to challenge its orders. In this re-
gard 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Sec. 575 pro-
vides: 
"But where a specific duty is assigned by law, mid 
individual rights depend upon the performMtce 
of that duty, it seems equally clewr that the i~i­
vidual who considers himself injured has a right 
to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy . 
. . . " (Emphasis added) 
A further statement regarding planitiffs' right to 
bring this action is found in the same authority. 
"Where the object is to enforce a public dutrnot 
due the government as such, any private citizen 
may sue." 
See 35 Am. J ur. Mandamus Sec. 319. 
"The rule established by the preponderance of 
authority is that where the question is one of pu~~ 
lie right and the object of the mandamus is h 
procure the enforcement of a public duty, t e 
15 
rela~or _need no~ show that he has any legal or 
spemal mterest m the result since it is sufficient 
that he is interested as a ~itizen in having the 
laws executed and the duty in question enforced. 
" 
See 35 Am. J ur. Mandamus, Sec. 320, p. 73. See also 
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 23 L.Ed. 
-±28; Crockett v. Board of Education, 58 Utah 303, 199 
Pac. 158. 
The Crockett case, supra, involved an action com-
menced in District Court against the Board of Educa-
tion of Carbon County to compel the publication of an 
annual statement of receipts and disbursements as was 
provided by law. The plaintiff was a resident taxpayer 
and citizen of Carbon County. The defendant, Board 
of Education, in that case argued that the plaintiff was 
without legal capacity to sue in that "the plaintiff has 
no such personal interest in the matter of the publica-
tion of a statement as would entitle him to maintain 
the action against the defendants." 
The defense raised in that case was substantially that 
presented to the court by the defendant, Liquor Control 
Commission in the present action. In 1917 the law pro-
vided that a Writ of Mandamus could be issued" ... to 
compel the performance of an action which the law spe-
cially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, 
or station." This law is for all practical purposes similar 
to Rule 65B(b) (3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But 
~ection 7392 of the laws of Utah, 1917, also provided that 
the writ would be issued upon the application of the party 
b(meficially interested. This requirement is not present 
16 
in the current law. However, even with the requirement 
of a beneficial interest, the Utah Supreme Court m· , re-
sponse to the Carbon County Board of Education's alle-
gation that the plaintiff had no beneficial or special 
interest in the publication of the statement, stated: 
"As to just when, within the meaning of the stat-
ute, a party is beneficially interested in the per-
formance of an official duty on the part or a pub-
lic officer, is not ah\Tays a matter of easy deter-
mination .... In the present case it is shown that 
the plaintiff is a citizen and a resident taxpayer 
of Carbon County School District. As such we 
are not prepared to say that within the meaning 
of our statute, he is not a party beneficially in-
terested in having a statement prepared and pub-
lished in the manner in which the law expressly 
and clearly enjoins. True it is, plaintiff seeks the 
performance of a duty that does not concern him-
self alone, but one that inures to the benefit of all 
citizens and taxpayers of the district alike; yet 
at the same time he himself as a citizen and tax-
payer necessarily has sufficient interest and the 
right to maintain the action . . . (citing cases). 
"It follows from what has been said that the plain-
tiff in this action has the legal right to sue. · .. " 
The Crockett case, together with Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, was cited by the 1964 Utah 
Supreme Court in Archer v. State Land Board, 15 Utah 
2d 321, 392 P.2d 622, as authority for the proposition 
that district courts have "authority to issue writs in 
the nature of mandamus where it is made to appear that 
the administrative board or officer has a clear statutory 
duty to perform a certain act and it or he refuses to do 
so." 392 P.2d 622, 623. 
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ln the instant matter it appears from the complaint 
that plaintiffs are residents of the county and that plain-
tiff, Theodore Horman, is the father of minor children 
who are also citizens and residents of Salt Lake County. 
The rnupose of the Liquor Control Act as found by the 
Utah Supreme Court and as set forth in Sec. 32-1-2, 
FCA 1953, is ''the protection of the public health, peace 
and morals; to prevent the recurrence of abuses associ-
ated with saloons; to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and 
unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic 
beverages.'' 
If the actions of defendant, Liquor Control Commis-
sion of Utah, violate the Liquor Control Act of the state 
as has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court and 
if plaintiff is a citizen of this state and the father of 
minor children, it appears that he clearly has a beneficial 
interest in the enforcement of the Act designed to safe-
guard and protect the morals of the citizens of this state. 
CONCLUSION 
To deny relief in the present case is to deny all citi-
zens of the state of Utah the right to the compelling 
process of the courts where defendant appears to be 
clearly derelict in its official duties. 
It has been said that the purpose of Mandate is that 
of compelling action where law enjoins it and the person 
or tribunal refuses to act in accordance therewith. See 
Hoffman v. Lewis, 31 Utah 179, 87 Pac. 167. All citizens 
have the right to see that the laws of the state are prop-
t'rly enforced. If the courts are closed to citizens in cases 
18 
like the present one, it is difficult to conceive how the 
interests of the public generally are to be safeguarded. 
It is submitted that the right sought to be defined and 
protected in the present case is one of which this court 
should take jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Wilford W. Kirton, Jr. and 
F. Burton Howard 
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